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I.  INTRODUCTION 
To preserve the freedom of the human mind and freedom of the press, 
every spirit should be ready to devote itself to martyrdom; for as long as 
we may think as we will, and speak as we think, the condition of man will 
proceed in improvement.1 
 
On June 22, 2000, the Third Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction2 ruling that 
the Child Online Protection Act (C.O.P.A.), 42 U.S.C. § 231, designed to protect 
                                                                
1Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Green Mumford (June 18, 1799), The Letters of 
Thomas Jefferson: 1793-1826, at http://educ.let.zng.n\/~usa/P/tj3/writings/bzf/jefl127.htm 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2000). 
2ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000).  
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juveniles using the World Wide Web from “harmful material”3 measured by 
“contemporary community standards,” violated the First Amendment and thus, was 
unconstitutional.  The federal court’s criticism of the “community standard” test for 
determining obscenity came very close to declaring that the test was unworkable 
with respect to the internet and determined that as far as obscenity was concerned, 
the internet deserved special consideration apart from other media such as books, 
videos, and broadcast.  
This note concurs with the decision reached by the Third Circuit.  The federal 
obscenity law, which incorporated the contemporary community standards test is 
unconstitutional as applied to expression on the internet because it has chilling effect 
on the exercise of freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.  Such unconstitutionality is demonstrated in 
situations where people exercising their right to free speech potentially face 
prosecution under federal obscenity laws where the obscenity test is likely to be 
based on the community standards of the most stringent contemporary views.4  
Incoherent guidelines and differing community standards create a chilling effect 
on the exercise of First Amendment rights because creators of websites risk 
prosecution in communities that have the most stringent views on obscenity.  For 
example, what happens if a resident of California creates a website displaying 
sexually explicit materials which conform to the community standards of the 
community, in which he or she resides and those materials are downloaded by a 
viewer in Oklahoma? In this situation, even though the host of the website did not 
intentionally solicit the download in this particular geographical region, the owner of 
the website may be prosecuted under the federal law and likely convicted if the 
materials posted on the web are found obscene by the assumingly less liberal 
community standards of Oklahoma.  
At the present time, there is no technology that would allow a website operator to 
limit the locales in which the sexually explicit material might appear.  Therefore, in 
order to avoid prosecution, a person intending to express himself by publishing 
sexual materials on the internet must ensure that such materials comply with the 
most stringent contemporary standards in the country.  Web publishers do not have 
another alternative, because there is no guarantee that somebody from that 
community will not access the website and by virtue of this possibly subject the 
owner of the materials to criminal prosecution.  As a result, freedom of speech is 
unreasonably and unconstitutionally restrained. 
Because freedom of speech would be restrained by any incorporation of 
community standards in federal regulation of the internet, the legislature should 
refrain from adopting a standard that would apply in all internet situations.  Rather, 
with respect to obscenity, the internet should be left to self-regulation.   
                                                                
3
“Harmful material” is defined by Child Online Protection Act as any “communication . . . 
that is obscene or that—the average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, 
or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;depicts, describes, or respects, in a manner 
patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, 
an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or 
post-pubescent female breast; andtaken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic political, or 
scientific value to minors.”  47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (2000). 
4See United States v. Thomas, 74 F. 3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).  
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In reaching this conclusion, Part II provides a brief historical timeline in the 
development of obscenity law.  Part IV of this comment examines the nature of the 
ever-changing medium of the internet and governmental actions directed at 
regulating speech expressed through this medium.  After that, Part V of the article 
looks into the soundness of the contemporary community standards aspect of the 
current obscenity test as it applied to the internet, and also examines alternatives to 
the test.  Finally, the comment concludes that the Miller v. California test for 
obscenity is not workable as applied to the internet and for lack of another 
constitutionally protective test, this medium should be left free from federal 
regulation. 
II.  OBSCENITY LAW AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Courts and juries have always been puzzled when facing the task of determining 
what constitutes obscenity.  The long process of developing a workable test is still 
far from the finish line and there is little hope that it will ever be reached.  In 1868, 
the first attempt to establish an obscenity test was authored by Lord Chief Justice 
Cockburn in Regina v. Hicklin.5  In Hicklin, the matter in controversy was a 
pamphlet describing the immoral character of Catholic priests.6  The test for 
obscenity proposed by the Chief Justice was “whether the tendency of the matter 
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such 
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.”7  For a 
number of years, the Hincklin test was recognized as the primary standard for 
obscenity in the United States as well.  The test, however, underwent wide criticism,8 
which eventually led to the adoption of a different test in Roth v. United States.9 
The First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the United States government 
from limiting the expression of speech.10  Obscene material is, however, not entitled 
to constitutional protection under the First Amendment.  In Roth, the Court stated 
that the First Amendment was not meant to protect obscene speech since obscene 
matter had no social value.11  The new test for obscenity espoused by the Roth 
                                                                
53 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (Eng. 1868). 
6Id. at 362. 
7Id. at 371. 
8In United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), Judge Learned Hand 
considered the test as unduly harsh.  See also United States v. One Book Called Ulysses, 5 F. 
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).  
9354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957) (upholding a federal statute that made it a crime to mail 
“[e]very obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, 
print, or other publication of an indecent character”). 
10
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
11The Court concluded that: 
[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, 
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the 
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the 
limited area of more important interests.  But implicit in the history of the First 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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decision was “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal[ed] to prurient 
interest.”12  It was in Roth that the Court first defined a “prurient interest” as a 
“shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, where the material goes 
substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of 
such matters.”13  Once again, the Court’s attempt at creating an obscenity test was far 
from being clear—it was neither possible to ascertain who was an “average person,” 
or what “contemporary community standards” entailed. 
Half a decade later, in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,14 the patent offensiveness 
aspect of the modern test for obscenity began to form.  In this case, the Supreme 
Court had to decide whether magazines, which appealed to prurient interests but 
were not patently offensive could be deemed obscene.  The Court held that the 
magazines were not obscene because they could not be deemed “so offensive on 
their face as to affront current community standards of decency,” thereby, 
establishing the patent offensiveness test which has survived to the present day as 
part of the modern test for obscenity.15 
The next struggling effort by the Supreme Court to determine whether obscene 
speech could be meaningfully defined or punished criminally was in Jacobellis v. 
Ohio.16  In Jacobellis, the Court, although reaffirming the test in Roth, held that 
judgment as to whether a particular work was obscene should be made on the basis 
of a national standard.17  Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, gave his 
interpretation of “contemporary community standards” under the Roth test.  In doing 
so, he pointed out that a standard representing views of a particular local community, 
in which a certain matter is deemed obscene, would inevitably deny access to such 
material in communities where it is considered acceptable.18 
A different test was outlined in A Book Named “John Clelands’ Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of Massachusetts.19 Setting forth the new 
standard, the Court stated: 
as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it must 
be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a 
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently 
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating 
                                                          
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social 
importance…  
354 U.S. at 484. 
12Id. at 489. 
13Id. at 488 (equating the case law meaning of prurient interest with the definition of 
Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tent Draft No. 6, 1957)). 
14370 U.S. 478 (1962). 
15Id. at 482. 
16378 U.S. 184 (1964); see id. at 197 (Stewart, J., “I know it when I see it”). 
17Id. at 195 (“It is, after all, a national Constitution we are expounding.”). 
18Id. at 193.  
19383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
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to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material 
is utterly without redeeming social value.20 
Thus, the Supreme Court established a new tripartite test for obscenity.  Applying 
the newly constructed test, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the 
Clelands’ book was obscene.21  The Court reasoned that the book could not be 
considered obscene if it possessed some minimal literary, scientific, or artistic 
value.22  After the Memoirs test, it became a more difficult task for the prosecution to 
prove that a particular matter was obscene.  Thus, the scope of obscenity regulation 
was limited.23  
The current obscenity standard was fleshed out by the Supreme Court in the 1973 
decision of Miller v. California.24  In Miller, the Court was called upon to review the 
constitutionality of California Penal Code section 311.2(a).25  Pursuant to the 
California statute, distribution of matters considered obscene constituted a 
misdemeanor.  Miller, the defendant, was convicted under this statute for making 
unsolicited mass mailings of “adult” material depicting men and women engaging in 
a variety of sexual activities.26  In order to determine whether the material was 
obscene the Court constructed the following test: 
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether  the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.27 
III.  MODERN TEST FOR OBSCENITY 
The new three-prong test for obscenity formulated by the Court in Miller v. 
California was based primarily on the Roth test.28  As the first prong of the new 
                                                                
20Id. at 418. 
21Id. at 419. 
22Id.  
23FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 43 (1973). 
24413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
25Id. at 16. 
26Id. at 18. 
27Id. at 24.  
28The primary federal statute incorporating Miller test for obscenity is title 18, section 
1462 of the United States Code. Under this statute, the following materials were found to be 
obscene:  a magazine named The Name is Bonnie, a forty-eight page publication containing 
forty-five pages of nude photographs of same female model, emphasizing model’s sex organs, 
see Miller v. United States, 507 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1974); films depicting adult men and 
women participating in various sex acts including sexual intercourse with penetration, fellatio, 
cunnilingus, and masturbation, such acts being committed heterosexually and homosexually 
between couples and in groups, and which on several occasions showed semen ejaculated and 
then spread on women’s bodies, see United States v. American Theater Corp., 526 F.2d 48 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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definition of obscenity, the Court retained the prurient interest test articulated in 
Roth.  Thus, material would be obscene if an “average person,” would find that the 
material appeals to the prurient interest.29  The contemporary community standard 
first established in Roth was reconsidered and modified in Miller.  In Miller, the 
Court discarded the national standards part of the Roth test by giving this provision a 
more literal meaning.30  Under the holding in Miller, the fact finder has to apply 
contemporary community standards rather than national ones when determining 
whether material appeals to the prurient interest.31  In the opinion of the Court, it was 
“neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring 
that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found 
tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”32  Moreover, the Court stated that the 
application of a national community standard would be an endeavor in futility.33 
                                                          
(8th Cir. 1975), film Pornography: Copenhagen 1970, and trailers The Trucker’s Girl, Tender 
is the Flesh, Penetrator, Midnight Cowgirl, revealing almost every form of sexual intercourse, 
both natural and unnatural, in various positions, see United States v. Strand Art Theatre Corp., 
325 F. Supp. 256 (W.D. Mont. 1970), pictures portraying ultimate sexual act, both normal and 
perverted, consisting of representations of masturbation, genital exhibition, and various forms 
of sexual fetishes, see United States v. Kelly, 398 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Mont. 1975), rev’d on 
other grounds, 529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1976), and books comprising short stories explicitly 
describing various homosexual activities, including fellatio and sodomy, between men and 
boys and photographs showing completely nude boys with their genitals exposed, see United 
States v. Brown, 328 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Va. 1971).  
In contrast, the following sexually explicit materials were determined to be not obscene or 
immoral within the Miller test:  a scientific book written with seriousness and decency, and 
giving information to the medical profession regarding the operation of birth control clinics, 
including patron instructions necessary to be given out at such clinics, see United States v. 
One Book Entitled “Contraception,” 51 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1931), and a publication of 
informative and instructive character, explaining to married people how their mutual sexual 
life might be improved, see United States v. One Book Entitled “Married Love,” 48 F.2d 821 
(2d Cir. 1931). 
29In Roth, the Court defined the prurient appeal of the material as “material having a 
tendency to excite lustful thoughts.”  Roth, 354 U.S. at 487. It should also be noted that the 
Court stated that “under the holding announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution 
for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently 
offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written 
or construed.”  Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.  
30See id. at 32. 
31In articulating that community standards did not mean the standards of the nation as a 
whole, the Court referred to the comment of Chief Justice Warren in his dissent in Jacobellis 
v. Ohio:  
It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth that obscenity is to be defined by 
reference to ‘community standards,’ it meant community standards—not a national 
standard, as is sometimes argued.  I believe that there is no provable ‘national 
standard.’  … At all events the Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it would 
be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one. 
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.  
32Id.  Many scholars brought into question whether the Miller “community standards” test 
has a constitutional source.  See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 4 TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.60 (3rd ed. 1999); see also Gregory 
J. Battersby, Obscene and Indecent Materials, in GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss1/7
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The second part of the obscenity test enunciated in Miller is whether the work 
depicts or describes in a “patently offensive” way sexual conduct that is prohibited 
by the applicable state law.34  This prong of the test poses a requirement that the state 
obscenity statutes be specific in defining sexual depictions that are considered 
obscene.35  The patent offensiveness part of the test must be determined applying 
community standards.36 
The third prong of the Miller, namely:  “whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” [hereinafter “SLAPS 
test”] replaced the “utterly without redeeming social value” test in Roth.37  It should 
be noted that in contrast to the first two parts of the Miller test, it was held that the 
SLAPS test38 is to be applied using a reasonable person standard.39  In this respect, 
when determining the value of the work, contemporary community standards have 
                                                          
LAW OF THE INTERNET § 8.01, 8-9 (Aspen Law & Business 2001-1 Supp.) (questioning the 
discord between the community standards enunciated by the Court and the national nature of 
the First Amendment’s scope).  According to the Court, even though the fundamental limiting 
principles of the First Amendment on the states’ power are no different from one community 
to another, the diversity of tastes and attitudes of people in different states should not “be 
strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity.”  Miller, 413 U.S. at 33. 
33Id. at 30.   
34See id. at 24. 
35The Court provided several “plain examples of what a state statute could define for 
regulation under part (b) of the standard announced in this opinion . . . .”  See id. at 25.  “The 
examples of such conduct included: (a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of 
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive 
representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of 
the genitals.”  Id.  It should also be noted that the Court stated that “under the holdings today, 
no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these 
materials depict or describe patently offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the regulating state law, as written or construed.”  Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. 
36Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977) (stating that out of the three prongs of 
the Miller test only the first two—prurient appeal and patent offensiveness—are determined 
by applying contemporary community standards.  Accordingly, the first two parts of the test 
are to be determined by local juries and the third prong is to be decided by the judge). 
37See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 32, at 722 (noting that the replacement of the 
Memoirs “utterly” standard to “serious” empowered juries with more discretion under the new 
standard).  In rejecting the Memoirs standard, the Court reasoned that the standard created a 
“burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof.”  Miller, 413 
U.S. at 22. 
38
“SLAPS test” is the name by which attorneys refer to the “serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value” test. 
39Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).  “[T]he Court’s opinion stands for the clear 
proposition that the First Amendment does not permit a majority to dictate to discrete 
segments of the population . . . the value that may be found in various pieces of work. . . . 
Reasonable people certainly may differ as to what constitutes literary or artistic merit. . . . 
[T]he Court’s opinion today envisions that even a minority view among reasonable people that 
a work has value may protect that work from being judged ‘obscene.’”  Id. at 506 (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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no application because “literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” of materials is 
not deemed to vary from community to community.40  
A.  Community:  What is it?  
Although the court defined the obscenity test in Miller, it failed to provide a 
specific definition or geographic dimensions of the community standards for a jury 
to consider when deciding whether a particular work is obscene.  The Supreme Court 
attempted to articulate the notion of community in subsequent cases.  In Hamling v. 
United States,41 the Court interpreted Miller as permitting a state to constitutionally 
proscribe obscenity in terms of a statewide standard.42  However, delineation of such 
precise geographic area is not required “as a matter of constitutional law.”43  Thus, 
the Court reaffirmed its holding in Miller that the proper standards applied in federal 
obscenity prosecutions should be those of a community and not of a nation.44 
In Jenkins v. Georgia,45 the Court held that the Constitution did not establish a 
requirement to instruct juries, in state obscenity cases, to apply the standard of a 
hypothetical statewide community.46  Furthermore, the Court approved the trial 
court’s actions in instructing a jury to apply community standards without defining 
community.47  Affirming the Miller decision, the Court in Jenkins stated that a state 
was free to allow juries to rely “on the understanding of the community from which 
they came as to contemporary community standards,” and that the state had full 
                                                                
40Id. at 501.  
41418 U.S. 87 (1974).  In Hamling, William Hamling was convicted of mailing and 
conspiring to mail an obscene brochure with sexually explicit photographs in violation of 
federal law.  Id.  At trial, the jury was instructed to judge obscenity according to “what is 
reasonably accepted according to the contemporary standards of the community as a 
whole. . . .  Contemporary community standards means the standards generally held 
throughout this country concerning sex and matters pertaining to sex.  This phrase means, as it 
has been aptly stated, the average conscience of the time, and the present critical point in the 
compromise between candor and shame, at which the community may have arrived here and 
now.”  Id. at 103.  On appeal, the Court, acknowledging that such an instruction delineated a 
wider geographic area than warranted by Miller, held that the jury instruction referring to the 
standard of the “nation as a whole” nevertheless accomplished the principal purpose of the 
requirement that a judgment be made on the basis of “contemporary community standards,” 
which is “the material is judged neither on the basis of each juror’s personal opinion, nor by its 
effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person or group.”  Id. at 107. 
42Id. at 105. 
43Hamling, 418 U.S. at 105. 
44Id. at 104. 
45418 U.S. 153 (1974) (In Jenkins, the Supreme Court had to decide the validity of 
conviction of a theater manager who violated a Georgia obscenity statute for playing the 
motion picture Carnal Knowledge.).  
46Id. at 157. 
47Id. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss1/7
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discretion to provide a statutory definition of a community.48 Many states have acted 
on this proposition and established a statutory definition of a community.49  
Three years later, in Smith v. United States,50 the Supreme Court determined that 
although states were permitted to impose a geographic limit on community 
standards, no state legislature may proscribe what those standards should be.51  
According to the Court, juries are entitled to rely on their own knowledge of 
community standards and consider the “entire community and not simply their own 
subjective reactions, or the reactions of a sensitive or of a callous minority.”52  
Nevertheless, all definitions of obscenity, make little sense because “this type of 
judgment is inevitably subjective and personal.  Court and juries continue to differ 
over what constitutes obscenity, often including in that category materials that have 
                                                                
48Id.  The court also noted that an obscenity offense in terms of contemporary community 
standards could be defined by states similarly to the definition in Miller, or in more precise 
geographic terms.  Id.  Many states have acted on this proposition and have established 
statutory definitions of a community.  A states’ definition of community vary greatly with 
other states, examples include communities equated with the size of (a) state, (b) county, 
locality, or vicinage, and (c) the area from which the jury is drawn.  For a comprehensive list 
of jurisdictions, which have statutorily defined community see Richard N. Coglianese, Sex, 
Bytes, and Community Entrapment: The Need for a New Obscenity Standard for the Twenty-
First Century, 24 CAP. U.L. REV. 385, 406 n.162-64, 166 (1995). 
49The states’ definitions of community vary greatly and examples include communities 
equated with the size of (a) state, (b) county, locality, or vicinage, and (c) the area from which 
the jury is drawn.  Military courts have gone beyond the idea of a geographic community and 
apply a military community standard.  See United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568 (A.F. Crim. 
App. 1995); United States v. Dyer, 22 M.J. 578 (A.C.M.R. 1986).  For a comprehensive list of 
jurisdictions which have statutorily defined the community see Coglianese, supra note 48, at 
406 nn.162-64, 166.  For a compilation of jurisdictions determining the dimensions of a 
community through judicial process see Patrick T. Egan, Virtual Community Standards: 
Should Obscenity Law Recognize the Contemporary Community Standard of Cyberspace?, 30 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 117, 144 n.204-05 (1996). 
50431 U.S. 291 (1977).  
51Id. at 303.  In United States v. Danley, 523 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1975), the court held that 
lack of state prohibition on dissemination of obscene materials in Oregon did not establish 
community standards for that state; violation was of a federal statute which was neither 
dependant nor incorporated state laws.  The court reasoned that the fact that certain conduct is 
permitted by the state did not necessarily mean that that people within the state approve of 
such conduct.  The court also approved the trial court’s consideration of community as 
embracing more than the state of Oregon. 
52Smith, 431 U.S. at 305.  One commentator expressed concern regarding the jury’s 
discretion as to the determination of what community standards are, by stating that: 
If the trier of fact is free to identify and apply community standards unrestrained by 
judicial or legislative specification of the relevant community, and without regard to 
evidence introduced at trial, the trier of fact’s conclusions … with the weight of the 
evidence, and unaware of he specific community whose standards were supposedly 
applied, an appellate court is left without benchmarks by which to judge the validity of 
a finding of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness.  
See Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1844 (1975).  
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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won world-wide acclaim.”53  The concept of community standards has been very 
controversial since its inception, and it gave birth to a host of problems, especially 
with respect to jurisdictional issues.   
The issue of what community standards should govern in an obscenity 
prosecution is even more problematic when allegedly obscene materials travel 
through multiple communities.  This critical issue of defining the applicable 
community standard with respect to transmission of obscene materials via the 
internet was highlighted in United States v. Thomas.54  In this case, operators of the 
Amateur Action Computer Bulletin Board System were convicted and sentenced to 
prison for transmitting obscene materials over interstate telephone lines.55  The 
defendants, who operated their computer bulletin board from California, were 
prosecuted in Memphis, Tennessee, when the pornographic materials were 
transmitted to a U. S. Postal Inspector, a resident of Tennessee.56  
The Court found that the federal statute criminalizing transmission of obscenity 
over interstate telephone lines covered transmission of computerized images.57  The 
Court rejected the contention that the only information transferred by their system 
were intangible strings of binary code, which were arguably beyond the scope of the 
statute.58  The Court found that it was “spurious” for the defendants to claim that 
they did not intend to sell, disseminate or share obscene files.59  The defendants 
argued that the relevant community standards, which should be employed by the 
Court, were those of the place where the transmission originated.60  The predominant 
view, however, is that the appropriate legal standard to be used is the place where the 
obscene materials are received.61  
                                                                
53AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CENSORSHIP OF OBSCENITY:  PORNOGRAPHY AND 
INDECENCY, POLICY NO. 4, POLICY GUIDE, at http://www.eff.org/pub/censorship/ 
obscenity_and_censorship_aclu.article (last visited Sept. 25, 2001). 
5474 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). 
55Id. at  705. 
56Id. at 705-06.  
57Id. at 706-07. 
58Id. at 706.  When the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the 
defendants’ contention was that title 18, section 1465 of the United States Code applied only 
to tangible materials and did not apply to intangible images stored and transmitted as computer 
files. 
59Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706-07. 
60Id. at 711. 
61See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106 (providing that “[t]he fact that distributors of allegedly 
obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various federal 
judicial districts into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute 
unconstitutional because of the failure of application of uniform national standards of 
obscenity”); see also United States v. Cohen, 583 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that in a 
prosecution for distribution of obscene material, the applicable community standards were 
those of the district where materials were shipped to and delivered, and in which the federal 
government prosecuted the case rather than the standards of the district where the materials 
were mailed). 
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One of the questions that accompanies any obscenity prosecution is which 
community’s standards should be applied in a given case.  It has long been 
established that it is constitutional to subject interstate distributors of obscenity to 
varying community standards.62  It has also been recognized that issues pertaining to 
which community’s standards are to be applied in an obscenity prosecution have a 
lot in common with issues regarding venue.63  According to 18 U.S.C. § 3237, venue 
for federal obscenity prosecutions lies in any district from, through or into which the 
allegedly obscene material moves.64  Thus, either the “district of dispatch or the 
district of receipt” may serve as a forum for prosecutions, with the community 
standards being of the place where the trial takes place.65  Such a state of law allows 
the prosecution to forum shop and adds even more confusion into already 
complicated community standards issues.   Keeping in mind that the prosecution has 
a choice of bringing a prosecution either in the district of receipt or the district of 
transmittal, if the indictment is originally brought in a district where obscene 
materials were mailed or transmitted, standards of that community may still be used 
if the case is transferred to the district of delivery.66  
The court in United States v. Mohney67 voiced a concern regarding such an 
application of community standards.  In Mohney, nine defendants were indicted for 
using a common carrier for interstate carriage of obscene material in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2, 1462 (1976).68  The allegedly obscene materials were placed in 
interstate commerce in the Eastern District of Michigan and distributed in multiple 
districts around the country.69  The case was originally brought in the Eastern District 
of Michigan, but eventually was transferred to the District of Hawaii, where the court 
had to address the issue of the applicable obscenity standards.70  Attempting to solve 
this issue, the court acknowledged that given the prosecution’s ability to choose a 
forum between either the place of mailing or the place of address or delivery, under 
the then and now current law, “the applicable standards should be those of the 
community where the action is brought.”71  Because the charges were brought in the 
                                                                
62See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106; United States v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210, 217 (6th Cir. 
1979). 
63United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996). 
64Id. (stating that “[t]his may result in prosecutions of persons in a community to which 
they have sent materials which is obscene under that community’s standards though the 
community from which it is sent would tolerate the same material.”). 
65Id. (citing United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 830-31 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
66United States v. Mohney, 476 F. Supp. 421 (D. Haw. 1979). 
67Id. 
68Id. at 423.  
69Id. (the destinations to which the sexually explicit materials were delivered included 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Studio City, California; Atlanta, Georgia; Honolulu, Hawaii; 
Denver, Colorado; and Providence, Rhode Island). 
70Id. (District of Hawaii was one of communities in which the allegedly obscene materials 
were distributed). 
71Mohney, 476 F. Supp. at 425. 
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Eastern District of Michigan, the court would have to instruct the jury from the 
District of Hawaii to determine and apply the local community standards of the 
Eastern District of Michigan.  
While admitting that theoretically such resolution of the matter was possible “so 
long as the government ha[d] the right to choose its own forum, and so long as local 
community standards [were] the measuring stick,”72 the court opined that since “[i]t 
would be senseless to allow the community where the materials were transmitted to 
make the obscenity determination, but force that community to use the standards of 
the community where the materials were distributed,” it would equally make little 
sense to have the jury from the district of receipt of allegedly obscene material to 
make the determination of obscenity judging by community standards of the district 
of transmission.73  “If jurors cannot draw on personal knowledge, the idea of local 
community standards is a totally useless concept.”74 
Although issues like the one described above do not come up frequently in 
obscenity prosecutions under federal law, they create more of a concern in state 
cases.  For instance, in an obscenity case tried under state law in a jurisdiction 
recognizing “statewide” community standards, the jury is instructed to apply the 
standards of the community that is the size of the state.  The jury pool in such 
prosecution is, however, comprised not of the citizens of the state as a whole but 
rather of residents of a judicial district where the court sits, be it a county or other 
municipal subdivision of the state.  The problem that arises under such circumstances 
is that the “statewide community standards” is nothing but fiction because jurors 
being pulled from a very small locality would not be able to use their own 
considerations on what is considered obscene in the community with which they are 
familiar, but rather they would have to guess at what the state standards are.  To 
prove such “statewide” standards, the prosecution is usually free to put on expert 
testimony.  At the same time, “[w]hile expert opinions may be relevant, jurors are 
completely free to disregard all expert testimony.”75  
Application of the community standards concept to the internet has created even 
more problems for the courts to deal with.  Courts applying the Miller test could not 
have possibly anticipated that there would be a new community that would defy 
traditional definitions and make application of the Miller test even more of a 
challenge than it already had been.  If the test is replete with difficulties even when 
applied to conventional media, in the era of the internet the community standards 
aspect of the test is practically unworkable.  
                                                                
72Id. at 427. 
73Id. at 425-26.  The court also noted that there was no precedent on the issue of whether 
the community standards of the district of transmission might be used when the case is 
originally brought in that district and then transferred.  In the court’s opinion such question 
was unlikely to come up because of high likelihood of the transmission district being a large 
city with more liberal views than smaller communities in which the material would be 
distributed and thus the defendants would be reluctant to transfer the case elsewhere.  Id. at 
426 n.6.  
74Id. at 427.  
75Mohney, 476 F. Supp. at 426-27 (reasoning that the cornerstone of the decisions in 
Miller and Hamling was the idea that jurors should draw on personal knowledge of their own 
community). 
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IV.  INTERNET AND FREE SPEECH 
“Internet,” “cyberspace,” and “information superhighway” are some of the many 
names people have been calling a relatively new medium known also as world wide 
web.  This medium originally started out as a creation of the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency [hereinafter “ARPA”], an entity under control of the Department of 
Defense.76 The ARPAnet—a communications network created by ARPA in 1969 and 
intended for use as a safe place to discuss military research—soon lost much of its 
secrecy and other networks that were open for access by virtually anyone emerged.77  
It is hardly possible to determine the dimensions of the internet.78  This “network 
of networks”79 constantly evolves and grows in numbers of its users.80  The world 
wide web is comprised of millions of web sites all linked together so that a user is 
enabled to travel from one web page to another with the ease of a click of a button.81 
In a short period of time, the world wide web82 became a forum for communicating 
one’s ideas to “an audience larger and more diverse than any the Framers could have 
imagined.”83  “The internet in general, and the [world wide] web in particular, 
represents the most participatory marketplace of mass speech yet developed, it is in 
                                                                
76The ARPA was established in 1957 as a response by the United States to the launch of 
the first artificial earth satellite Sputnik by the USSR.  In light of fear by the Pentagon that 
new Soviet technology made possible for the nuclear warheads to reach the United States, the 
purpose of the agency was to achieve scientific and technological supremacy of the United 
States within the military field.  The idea was to come up with technology enabling computers 
network.  In case of a nuclear attack, even if some computers were destroyed, the rest would 
continue to function.  See Dave Kristula, The History of the Internet, at http://www.dave 
site.com/webstation/net-history.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2001).  See also Maureen A. 
O’Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 
615 (1998) (describing origins of the Internet); Douglas C. Heumann, United States v. 
Thomas: Will the Community Standard Be Roadkill on the Information Superhighway?, 23 
WIS. L. REV. 189 (1995). 
77David P. Miranda, Defamation in Cyberspace: Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Services Co., 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 231, 481 n.10 (1996).  
78See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating that due to its 
nature the Internet size is almost impossible to be determined at a given moment). 
79ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (defining the Internet as a 
“decentralized, self-maintaining series of redundant links among computers and computer 
networks, capable of rapidly transmitting communications without direct human involvement 
or control”). 
80See Scott. A. Shail, Note, Reno v. ACLU: The First Congressional Attempt to Regulate 
Pornography on the Internet Fails First Amendment Scrutiny, 28 U. BALT. L. REV. 273, 292 
(1998) (reporting that the total number of computer users with Internet access was expected to 
reach 200 million by the year 1999).  
81ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 2000) 
82See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 166 (noting that World Wide Web, a publishing forum, 
should be distinguished from the Internet). 
83ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999). “[S]exually explicit material 
includes text, pictures, audio and video images, extends from the modesty titillating to the 
hardest core.” Id. at 484. 
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many ways a far more speech-enhancing medium than radio or television, print, the 
mails or even the village green.”84  The type of information published on the web 
includes “every facet of art, literature, music, news, and debate,” as well as sexually 
explicit materials.85  As soon as the content of the web is made available for 
viewing–“published”–anybody anywhere in the world may access it.86  
A.  Bulletin Boards Should be Distinguished from the World Wide Web 
Bulletin Board Systems (hereinafter BBS), like the one involved in United States 
v. Thomas,87 in which a prosecution of a California couple for interstate 
transportation of obscene materials took place, are a variation of on-line services.  
Bulletin boards are defined as systems consisting of modems and personal 
computers, which allow its users to access other remote computers to transfer and 
download files, and also to use such services as e-mail, chat lines, and public 
messages.88  It should be noted that while the decision in United States v. Thomas 
dealt specifically with electronic bulletin boards, some argue that this precedent 
should be equally applicable to the internet and the world wide web.89  
These different on-line services should not be treated equally.  One of the 
important differences between world wide web and a BBS is that to become a 
member of most BBS one has to be approved for membership to such web sites and, 
therefore, access is limited.90  Thus, when a host of a website approves a potential 
member from a different jurisdiction, he or she explicitly approves transmissions of 
sexually explicit material into locations where users reside.  In this case, there should 
be no surprise for the website host if obscenity charges are brought against him and 
the community standards applied in a prosecution are of those locales where users 
receive the allegedly obscene materials.  In this respect, a BBS is a service with a 
great deal of interaction between users and administration of the website.  And 
accordingly in this type of situation, distribution of obscene materials can be 
prevented simply by denying membership and service to users from those 
jurisdictions which community standards are patently more puritanical.91  
                                                                
84Complaint in ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp 160, at 1*, at http://www.aclu.org/court/ 
nycdacomplaint.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2001). 
85See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 163. 
86Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484 (stating that no obstacles exist to prevent the content from 
entering any geographic location once it is published). 
8774 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). 
88Id. at 705. 
89Battersby, supra note 32, at § 8.03[A], 8-42.  
90Even the opinion in Thomas points out the important feature of BBS in that its operators 
by employing certain screening procedures could deny user access in jurisdictions where the 
risk of finding of obscenity was greater than that in California.  See 74 F.3d at 711.  
91In fact, many large-scale commercial distributors located in more liberal jurisdictions 
being aware of the fact that they may be prosecuted for distribution of obscenity into 
conservative jurisdictions have chosen against distributing into jurisdictions where likelihood 
of prosecution is high. See Mike Godwin, Community Standards and BBSs, at 
http://www.eff.org/pub/Censorship/obscen_virtcom_stds_godwin.article (last visited Nov. 10, 
2000). 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss1/7
2001] CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS 119 
The nature of world wide web differs significantly from BBS in this respect.  The 
operators of regular websites cannot preclude the risk of liability even if they wished 
not to subject themselves to liability in communities with less tolerant obscenity 
standards.  The nature of web sites is passive because there is little or no interaction 
between hosts of those sites and users.  Moreover, a host, once he publishes materials 
on the site, cannot restrict access to and downloading of those materials onto 
computers of users who reside in communities in which such matters are considered 
obscene.92  In fact, anybody anywhere in the world if equipped with a computer and 
internet access can download to his computer whatever material is posted on the site.  
Many issues, such as jurisdictional ones, that followed the introduction of a new 
medium are not new, but with respect to attempts to bridle them, a strong temptation 
exists to treat them within old concepts that are inappropriate for the new context.  
Unsuccessful state and federal legislative attempts to regulate the medium of the new 
era examined below demonstrate the need for new approaches in solving problems 
accompanying the internet.  
B.  Speech Regulation and the Internet 
The internet may fairly be regarded as a never-ending worldwide 
conversation.  The government may not, through the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 (hereinafter “CDA”), interrupt that conversation.93 
1.  Federal Attempts to Regulate the Internet 
Ever since the electronic wonder of the internet came to life, Congress was 
concerned with the issues of regulating the content of this medium.  Easy availability 
of pornographic and obscene materials on the internet provoked the first attempt by 
the government to regulate the content of online communications in the CDA.94  
Congress decided to treat the internet as a broadcast medium and susceptible to strict 
governmental regulation in contrast to print media.95  Thus, the CDA was placed 
under the jurisdiction of the FCC, which is responsible for enforcement of the 
broadcast medium’s regulations such as television, radio, and cable.96  The CDA 
included provisions dealing with three main felonious prohibitions. 
The first prohibition related to telecommunications devices that were used 
knowingly in the transmission of any obscene or indecent material with an intent to 
annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any other person or with knowledge that the 
recipient of the communication is under eighteen years of age.97  Section 223(d)(1) of 
the CDA prohibited use of an “interactive computer service” to “display in a manner 
available to a person under 18 years of age” a communication that, “in context, 
                                                                
92
“Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available to all other Internet users 
worldwide.”  ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
93Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883 (Dalzell, J., concurring).  
9447 U.S.C. § 223(a)(B), (a)(2)(d) (2000). 
95See Battersby, supra note 32, at § 8.02[C], 27. 
96See id. 
9747 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
120 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:105 
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”  Finally, section 
223(a)(1)(A)(ii) made it a crime to use a telecommunications device to send an 
indecent communication “with intention to annoy” to any person, regardless of age.  
Almost immediately after enactment of the CDA, lawsuits were filed to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute.  
In ACLU v. Reno,98 plaintiffs filed suit seeking enjoinment of the enforcement of 
two of the above mentioned provisions.99  The purpose of the provisions was to 
prevent minors from gaining access not only to obscene materials, but also to 
“indecent” and “patently offensive” materials communicated over the internet.100  
The opponents of the CDA argued that the statute restricting internet content 
infringed upon adults’ right to free speech.  On February 15, 1996, the CDA was 
enjoined to the extent it purported to prohibit “indecent” material, regulation of 
which was not within the government’s power.101  
The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court 
affirmed the holding finding the challenged provisions unconstitutional.102  The 
Court reasoned that the content-based restrictions on transmission of speech were 
ambiguous, chilled protected speech, and were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
the goals of protecting children from indecent materials.103  More specifically, the 
Court held that the CDA failed to satisfy the three-prong test designed in Miller, in 
that the banned material was not “specifically defined by the applicable law.”104  The 
Court also determined that the internet should not be regulated in a manner similar to 
broadcast media, such as television and radio, and should not be subject to the same 
relaxed First Amendment scrutiny as the broadcast medium, but rather should be 
entitled to full First Amendment protection.105  Because the CDA purported to 
regulate the content of speech, the government had a high burden of proving that the 
statute complied with the constitutional requirements and thus, in striking down the 
federal law, the Court emphasized that  “in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to 
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”106  
                                                                
98929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
99The challenged provisions included: 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) and (d) (2000). 
10047 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(d) (2000). 
101See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 824 (providing a comprehensive opinion as to the reasons for 
granting preliminary injunction).  
102Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
103Id. at 879.  
104See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
105Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-69. 
106Id. at 885.  
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In ApolloMedia Corp.107 v. Reno,108 the constitutionality of another section of the 
CDA was brought into question, i.e., § 223(a)(1)(A)(ii).  This provision criminalized 
the use of a telecommunications device to send an obscene or indecent 
communication with “intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person.”  
The court in ApolloMedia upheld the challenged portion of the CDA, holding that 
the language of the statute was intended to regulate only obscenity, and not indecent 
language.109  
The second and most recent Congressional attempt to regulate the content of the 
internet in the name of “the children,” was the Child Online Protection Act of 1998 
(hereinafter “COPA”).110  After the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the 
CDA that sought to regulate the dissemination of indecent materials over the 
internet, its successor, referred to by some as “the son of the CDA”,111 represents the 
attempt of Congress to get around the constitutional defects of the CDA.  The 
governmental intervention through the enactment of the COPA was premised on 
findings that the “harmful material” posted on the world wide web was easily 
accessible by children while the current technology proved to be ineffective in 
restricting such access.112  Section 231 of Title 47 provided in pertinent part that 
“[w]hoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in 
interstate or foreign communication for commercial purposes that is available to any 
minor and that includes any material that is harmful113 to minors shall be fined not 
more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.”114  Before liability 
can attach under the COPA, material published on the web must be found “harmful 
to minors” by applying a three-part test, which mirrors that in Miller.115  
The COPA also provided a “safe harbor”—three affirmative defenses for web 
sites operators who in good faith, restricted access by minors to material that is 
harmful to minors.  Defendants could avoid conviction for violating the COPA if 
they (a) required “use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult 
personal identification number;”116 or (b) accepted a digital certificate that verifies 
                                                                
107Plaintiff, a corporation maintaining a web site entitled “annoy.com,” allowed its users to 
send e-mail messages that might be considered indecent by some communities to various 
government public officials and public figures. 
10819 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
109Id. at 1096. 
11047 U.S.C. § 231 et seq. Sponsored by Rep. Mike Oxley, R-Ohio, and Sen. Dan Coats, 
R-Ind. and approved by the 105th Congress, COPA was signed into law by President Clinton 
on October, 23, 1998.  
111Henry Cohen, When Smut Hurts, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2000, at 70. 
112ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000). 
113For definition of “harmful to minors” as outlined in COPA, see supra note 3.  
11447 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000). 
11547 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (2000). 
11647 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A) (2000). 
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age;117 or (c) restricted access by minors to harmful material “by any other 
reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology.”118 
2.  Challenge to COPA 
The COPA was challenged immediately by the American Civil Liberties Union 
on behalf of seventeen groups and individuals in ACLU v. Reno.119  The 
constitutional challenges raised by ACLU were as follows: (1) the COPA was 
facially invalid under the First Amendment as a burden to speech that is 
constitutionally protected for adults, (2) it was facially invalid because it violated the 
First Amendment rights of minors, and, (3) it was unconstitutionally vague in 
violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.120  In February 1999, enforcement of 
the provisions of the COPA was enjoined by the federal district court in 
Philadelphia.  In April 1999, the Justice Department appealed to the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  The Third Circuit upheld the district court finding that COPA 
“impos[ed] a burden on speech that is protected for adults” and, therefore, was 
unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.121  In affirming the grant of 
preliminary injunction, the appellate court based its opinion primarily on the basis of 
the likely unconstitutionality of the clause defining “harmful to minors” applying 
“contemporary community standards.”122  The overbreadth of this provision which 
was “virtually ignored by the parties and the amicus in their respective briefs but 
raised by us at oral argument” was of such concern to the court that it was led to 
conclude as to the likelihood of the COPA’s unconstitutionality, in its entirety 
without reference to its other provisions.123  
Although enforcement of the statute was enjoined, the work of the Commission 
on Online Child Protection (hereinafter “Commission”), which Congress established 
along with the COPA in October 1998, continued.  The Commission was composed 
of nineteen members representing internet access services; providers of internet 
filtering, blocking services or software; academic experts; content providers, and 
government.124  This entity was directed to conduct a study in order to identify 
                                                                
11747 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(B) (2000). 
11847 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(C) (2000). 
11931 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d 217 F. 3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (The plaintiffs, a 
group of web site operators and publishers, included ACLU (on behalf of all its members 
including Nadine Strossen, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Patricia Nell Warren, Mitchell Tepper and 
David Bunnell); Androgyny Books, Inc. d/b/a A Different Light Bookstores; American 
Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression (on behalf of all its members); Artnet Worldwide 
Corporation; Blackstripe; Addazi Inc. d/b/a Condomania; Electronic Frontier Foundation; 
Electronic Privacy Information Center; Free Speech Media; Internet Content Coalition; 
OBGYN.NET; Philadelphia Gay News; Powell’s Bookstore; RIOTGRRL; Salon Internet, 
Inc.; West Stock, Inc. and PlanetOut Corporation). 
120Id. at 477. 
121Reno, 217 F.3d at 162.  
122Id. at 166. 
123Id. at 174. 
124COPA COMMISSION, INFORMATION AND RESOURCES ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON ONLINE 
CHILD PROTECTION (COPA), at http://www.copacommission.org/commission/orginal.shtml 
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technological and other methods for reducing access by minors to material that is 
harmful to minors on the internet.  In doing so, the Commission was supposed to 
assess potential solutions in light of the technical realities of the internet and legal 
concerns raised by the First Amendment, privacy and law enforcement interests.  
The Commission’s mandate expired, and on October 20, 2000, the Commission 
submitted a detailed report to Congress setting forth its recommendations on how 
these problems should be handled.125  
3.  State Internet Laws 
State legislatures have not been idle as far as the regulation of the internet content 
is concerned, and many censorship laws have been enacted while others are in the 
making.  Many of the newly passed bills have been challenged on different 
constitutional grounds.  In American Library Association v. Pataki,126 the New York 
Decency Law127 was invalidated on Commerce Clause grounds.128  Here, New York 
law made it a crime to transmit material “harmful to minors” via computer to anyone 
aged seventeen or younger.129  The court held that the law unconstitutionally 
regulated conduct outside the state’s borders, created an impermissible intrusion into 
interstate commerce, and subjected use of the internet to inconsistent regulation.130 
                                                          
(last visited Sept. 25, 2001).  Among the members of the Commission were representatives of 
Network Solutions Inc., Internet Content Rating Association, Security Software Systems, 
Center for Democracy & Technology, Rocky Mountain College, National Law Center for 
Children and Families, Education Networks of America, Department of Justice, 
Crosswalk.com, Federal Trade Commission, Department of Commerce/NTIA, San Jose State 
University, PSINet Inc., Walt Disney Internet Group, Yahoo! Inc., Nortel Networks, America 
Online, Inc. and author of Kids Online/Founder, Protectkids.com.   COPA COMMISSION, 
INFORMATION AND RESOURCES ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON ONLINE CHILD PROTECTION ACT 
(COPA), at http://www.copacomm ission.org/report/commissioners.shtml (last visited Sept. 
25, 2001). 
125See COMMISSION ON ONLINE CHILD PROTECTION, REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000), 
available at http://www.copacommission.org/report/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2001) [hereinafter 
COMMISSION].  
126969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
127N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (1997). 
128969 F. Supp. at 167. 
129N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (1997). 
130Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173-80. With respect to the inconsistent effect of the law on the 
Internet, the court stated that  
[A]n internet user cannot foreclose access to her work from certain states or send 
differing versions of her communications to different jurisdictions.  In this sense, the 
Internet user is in a worse position than the truck driver or train engineer who can steer 
around Illinois or Arizona, or change the mudguard or train configuration at the state 
line; the Internet user has no ability to bypass any particular state.  The user must thus 
comply with the regulation imposed by the state with the most stringent standard or 
forego Internet communication of the message that might or might not subject her to 
prosecution. . . . Haphazard and uncoordinated state regulation can only frustrate the 
growth of cyberspace. 
Id. at 183.  
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In ACLU v. Johnson,131 the court affirmed issuance of preliminary injunction 
preventing enforcement of a New Mexico statute,132 which made it a crime to 
disseminate material “harmful to a minor” by computer.133  The statute was declared 
unconstitutional since the law would impermissibly regulate conduct outside New 
Mexico and thus violate the Commerce Clause,134 and would burden protected adult 
communication on the internet in violation of the First Amendment right to such 
speech.135  
In a more recent decision, Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler,136 the 
court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting 
the preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of a Michigan statute,137 which 
purported to prohibit the use of computers or the internet to disseminate “sexually 
explicit matter” to minors.138  
V.  SHOULD THERE BE A NEW STANDARD OR NO STANDARD AT ALL? 
As discussed earlier, the concept of community standards was established in 
Miller as part of the test for obscenity after the Supreme Court’s struggling efforts in 
1950’s and 1960’s to determine whether “obscene” speech could be either 
meaningfully defined or punished criminally.139  This prong of the Miller test is 
probably the most problematic with respect to its applicability to the internet.140  This 
                                                                
131194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999). 
132N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) (Michie Supp. 1998). 
133Id. 
134Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160-61. 
135Id. at 1155 (In agreeing with the holding of the district court, the appeals court stated 
that the statute violated the First Amendment “‘because it effectively bans speech that is 
constitutionally protected for adults;’” … “it was not ‘the least restrictive means of serving its 
stated interest;’” and it does not directly and materially advance a compelling governmental 
interest.).  
136238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000). 
1371999 Mich. Pub. Acts 33, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.671 (2001) et seq. 
138In reaching its decision, the district court stated that the statute limiting the receipt and 
communication of information through the Internet based on the content of that information 
was unconstitutional in that it “offend[ed] the guarantee of free speech in the First 
Amendment. . . .”  55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 751 (E. D. Mich. 1999).  
139See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 
(1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
140The criticism of the test as a whole was expressed even by several members of the 
Court.  See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1987) (Scalia, J.) (voicing need for 
“reexamination of Miller,” since determination of whether material has literary or artistic 
value is matter of taste and “De gustibus non est disputandum”); id. at 516 n.11 (Stevens, J.) 
(criminal prosecution for obscenity involving consenting adults should not be permitted); Paris 
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Alexander v. 
United States, 509 U.S. 544, 573 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, with Blackmun, Stevens and 
Souter, JJ.) (“obscenity separated from protected expression only by a ‘dim and uncertain 
line’”); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“line 
between communications which ‘offend’ and those which do not is too blurred to identify 
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concept connotes the standards of a community varying in size, but in no event, the 
size of such community reaching the dimensions of the nation.  The Court in Miller 
entertained the idea of applying the nationwide standards but promptly rejected it as 
unrealistic and vague.  
A.  Community Standards Versus Other Standards 
1.  National Standard 
When attempting to formulate a national standard for obscenity, one can 
probably pursue several approaches.  One way to define the nationwide standard 
would be by adopting, as the standard, the views of the community recognized as the 
most liberal and most acceptable to obscenity in the country.  The other would be to 
adopt the look at obscenity through the eyes of the people residing in the locale who 
have the least tolerance to the obscenity.141  It is evident that whatever approach is 
chosen, the end result will be that somebody’s tastes and attitudes will be trumped by 
differences of another group of people.  This result is inevitable, even if one tries to 
work out a standard in between these extreme points of view on obscenity.   
Recognizing that conducting obscenity prosecutions on the basis of a national 
“community standard” would be an exercise in futility, the Court in Miller stated that 
“[o]ur nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect 
that such standards [of what is patently offensive] could be articulated for all 50 
states in a single formulation.”142  In Court’s opinion “[i]t [was] neither realistic nor 
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of 
Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las 
Vegas, or New York City.”143  Thus, in denouncing the national standard, the Court 
was trying to prevent states with very liberal views from dictating their standards on 
more conservative states.  
Although the Supreme Court in Miller deemed it wrong and inadmissible for 
New York or Las Vegas to dictate their opinion on what is considered obscene to the 
conservative communities, the federal courts, as the decision in United States v. 
Thomas144 illustrates, consider it quite all right for a conservative community like 
Memphis, Tennessee to set standards for Milpitas, California.  Such an approach, 
however, should be equally inappropriate.  In this respect, it is laudable that the 
                                                          
criminal conduct”); accord, Board of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 576 
(1987) (O’Connor, J.: line too “murky”).  One of problems specific to the “community 
standards” prong of the Miller test is that a defendant is deprived of due process, since no 
notice of community standards is given until a jury identifies the relevant community and the 
content of such community standards.  See Cohen, supra note 111. 
141Under this interpretation the national standard would “have the effect of prohibiting the 
distribution of material in a more permissive community.”  See SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 
119.  
In fact, the nature of the Internet transforms the “local community standard” into a 
“national community standard” by pressuring Internet content providers to tailor speech to the 
least tolerant community. 
142413 U.S. at 30. 
143Id. at 32.  
14474 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).  
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Appellate Court for the Third Circuit found it likely unconstitutional to use 
“community standards” to judge speech communicated by means of a non-
geographic medium like the internet.145  “Because of the peculiar geography-free 
nature of cyberspace,” the appeals court wrote, “a ’community standards’ test would 
essentially require every Web communication to abide by the most restrictive 
community’s standards.”146  The non-geographic nature of the internet allows online 
communications to circulate throughout the world while the speaker, as a rule, has no 
information as to who the audience is and which communities the readers are 
from.147  Due to the fact that the web is not geographically constrained, applying the 
geographically oriented “community standards” simply does not work with the 
internet.  
An important point made by the court in ACLU v. Reno is that the internet is 
entitled to special considerations, because “each medium of expression must be 
assessed for the First Amendment purposes by the standards best suited to it, for each 
may present its own problems.”148  One of the main differences between the 
technology-laden medium of the internet and more conventional media such as 
books or videos is that a seller of adult books ordinarily makes a conscious and 
voluntary decision to distribute his product into a particular jurisdiction in which he 
might be subsequently prosecuted.  In this event, criminal intent is clearly 
established for the purpose of prosecution for distributing obscenity.  On the other 
hand, distribution from a website may occur without a website operator being aware 
of it.  Moreover, once material is published, website operators are totally without any 
means to limit access to their sites and prevent viewers of a given geographic 
community from receiving sexually explicit material in their jurisdiction.149  In the 
opinion of the Third Circuit, these crucial differences between a “brick and mortar 
outlet” and the online web dictate that a different approach is taken in applying a 
First Amendment analysis to the new medium.150  
2.  Virtual Community Standards 
In light of the fact that revolutional advancement in communications media 
changes the conventional meaning of “community,” a question arises as to whether it 
still makes sense to define the “community standards” in a localized geographic 
context.  One such alternative of defining “community standards” in terms of a non-
geographic community was proposed by defendants in Thomas—a virtual 
                                                                
145ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000).  
146Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78. 
147See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“An individual sending a 
message that will be retransmitted by a mail exploder program has no way of knowing the e-
mail addresses of other subscribers”); “[O]ne who posts an article to a news group has no way 
of knowing who will choose to retrieve it.”  Id. at 928.  
148217 F. 3d 162, 174 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
149American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[A]n Internet 
user cannot foreclose access to . . . work from certain states or send differing versions of . . . 
communication(s) to different jurisdictions . . . .  The Internet user has no ability to bypass any 
particular state”). 
150Reno, 217 F.3d at 175. 
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community “that is based on the broad-ranging connections among people in 
cyberspace.”151  The court in Thomas avoided consideration of whether a virtual 
community standard could be determined.  The court found it unnecessary to adopt a 
new definition of “community” for use in obscenity prosecutions involving bulletin 
boards because the defendants in Thomas knowingly sent the pictures to a specific 
recipient in Tennessee who was approved for membership of the board before 
placing a request that the pictures be sent to Tennessee.152  
Arguments made in favor of accepting online “community standards” for 
purposes of judging obscenity include a suggestion that the same reasoning applied 
by the Court in Miller should be applied to the online world.  In Miller, the Court, 
recognizing that different communities have different moral standards, held that like-
minded people living in those communities should be able to choose the rules by 
which to abide.153  An argument has been made that, by the same token, those who 
spend part of their lives online ought to be afforded an opportunity to live in a 
community where they feel comfortable.  Therefore, for purposes of determining 
whether a certain work distributed online is obscene, the standards of the virtual 
community should be taken as a guideline.154  At the same time, the proponent of 
these virtual standards raises a concern that, assuming the virtual community is 
recognized for purposes of obscenity test, the courts will have to establish who 
comprises this online community.155  
Among possible solutions as to how the online community should be defined one 
commentator suggests several alternatives: that it should encompass the whole 
world, only active users of the internet at a given moment, or that there should be not 
one but numerous communities comprised of people who communicate with each 
other.156  Others elaborate that applying virtual community standards would entail 
instructing the jury as to the nature of the internet, extent of sexually explicit material 
on the internet, availability of blocking and filtering devices as well as other 
information reasonably representing the virtual culture.157  
The endeavor to define virtual internet community and identify its populace is 
likely to prove to be a difficult if not impossible one, because the nature of this 
“community” changes and evolves so rapidly.  The problem that most proponents of 
                                                                
15174 F.3d at 711. 
152Id. at 712.  
153413 U.S. at 32. 
154LANCE ROSE, NETLAW: YOUR RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 250-51 (1995).  See also 
Egan, supra note 49 (technological aspects of the Internet compel a virtual community 
standard; Cyberspace users should have an opportunity to control the kind of information that 
is available in their online communities). 
155ROSE, supra note 154, at 251.  The author raises an unanswered question whether the 
Internet community should be thought of as comprised of the entire population of the 
cyberworld or only users of adult online services.  Id. 
156Kimberly A. Gobla, The Infeasibility of Federal Internet Regulation: The Online 
Parental Control Act of 1996 – A Reaction to the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 102 
DICK. L. REV. 93, 108 (1997). 
157See Egan, supra note 49, at 147. 
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the virtual community standards do not mention is that it would be equally 
impossible to establish certain guidelines for determining obscenity considering the 
dimensions of the Cyberspace.  “[T]he ‘community’ for the Internet is literally the 
world.”158  And, because the jury plays an important role in determining prurient 
interest and patent offensiveness parts of the obscenity test, some of the problems 
courts will have to face if the virtual community standards come up for consideration 
again will be related to jury impaneling.  As one commentator put it, defining an 
appropriate jury pool and assembling potential jurors for trial will be beyond the 
courts’ strength for reason that not too many people living in Florida would accept 
jury duty in Alaska.159  
3.  Is Obscenity Even a Problem? 
Denying First Amendment protection to obscenity, the Court in Roth v. United 
States justified its decision as furthering “the social interest in order and morality.”160  
This exception to the First Amendment, therefore allows the majority to censor 
speech on the basis of its taste.161  But should the majority’s ability to dictate what 
kind of speech it likes or dislikes reach as far as the domain of the internet? It may be 
conceded that obscenity can hurt individuals when it is integrated into the 
community by means of bookstores, movie theaters or newsstands.  As one 
commentator observes, in contrast, the potentially obscene material published on the 
web is out of the public view and thus, presents little “danger of offending the 
sensibilities of unwilling recipients.”162  The impact on the community is minimal 
because the material that is made available for viewing only to those members of the 
community who voluntarily choose to do so.  In this regard, if these viewers find the 
work offensive, they obviously want to be offended.163 
Even if the government continues its efforts to develop a test applicable in 
prosecutions of dissemination of obscene materials on the web, Congressional 
                                                                
158See Gobla, supra note 156, at 108. 
159Dominic F. Maisano, Obscenity Law and the Internet: Determining the Appropriate 
Community Standard after Reno v. ACLU, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 555, 577 (1998).  Another 
problem with the virtual community standard is difficulty to instruct jurors as to what “virtual 
community” considers obscene.  Although according to the Court in Kaplan v. California, 413 
U.S. 115, 121 (1973), “the defense should be free to introduce appropriate expert testimony” 
on the issue of community standards, in the light of the enormous size of the virtual 
community and vast variety of opinions, it is difficult to imagine that some common 
denominator of views on obscenity can be outlined. 
160354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). 
161See generally Cohen, supra note 111 (stating that determination of whether a particular 
work is obscene is a question of taste). 
162See Eric Handelman, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the Current Obscenity Standard 
Provide Individuals with the Proper Constitutional Safeguards?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 709, 730 
(1995) (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19 (1973) (recognizing that the States have a 
legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the 
mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of 
unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles)). 
163John T. Mitchell, An Exclusionary Rule for Protecting Obscenity, 10 J.L. POL. 183, 195 
(1994).  
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attempts to prohibit obscenity on the internet will not achieve the desired goal unless 
the worldwide effort is taken to regulate internet communications.  It is undisputed 
that a significant portion of sexually explicit material originates abroad164 and thus, 
even assuming that domestic legislation is successful in eradicating distribution of 
obscenity via the internet within the United States, sexually explicit materials will 
still be made available for viewing to Americans by the foreign websites.  The cycles 
of legislation and litigation that involve federal attempts to regulate the content on 
the internet indicate that future federal legislation on the subject, if any, is likely to 
be unsuccessful in passing constitutional muster.  Using the language of United 
States District Judge Stewart, it should be kept in mind that “Congress may not 
regulate indecency on the Internet at all . . . . Just as the strength of the Internet is 
chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the 
unfettered speech the First Amendment protects.”165  
4.  Children and Sexually Explicit Content of the Web 
Aside from preserving “order and morality,” protection of children from 
pornography which is so abundant in the Cyberworld is another interest that drives 
state and federal legislatures to enact laws regulating internet content.  While “the 
government has a compelling interest in protecting children from material that is 
harmful to them, even if not obscene by adult standards,” according to the Second 
Circuit, the government “may not regulate at all if it turns out that even the least 
restrictive means of regulation is still unreasonable when its limitations on freedom 
of speech are balanced against the benefits gained from those limitations.”166  
Enjoining enforcement of the COPA, United States District Judge Lowell Reed, Jr.  
mentioned that “blocking or filtering technology may be at least as successful as 
COPA would be in restricting minors’ access to harmful material online without 
imposing the burden on constitutionally protected speech. . . .”167  In light of 
governmental ineptitude to formulate constitutionally sound and workable 
regulations of the internet content, self-regulation by virtue of filtering and blocking 
unwanted material on the internet may be the only way to achieve the goal of 
protecting children from harmful material as well as preserving “order and morality” 
of the society at large.   
5.  Self-Regulation of Internet Content is a Constitutional Way to  
Achieve Legitimate Governmental Purposes 
In the wake of two failed Congressional attempts to regulate online content 
through the CDA and the COPA, the approach of self-regulation was strongly 
suggested among other recommendations presented by the Commission in its 49-
                                                                
164See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“as much as thirty percent of 
the sexually explicit material currently available on the Internet originates in foreign 
countries”).  
165Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 877, 883, aff’d, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
166Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
167ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d, 217 F. 3d 162 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
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page report to Congress.168  More specifically, with respect to self-regulation the 
COPA Commission recommends that Internet Service Providers (hereinafter “ISP”s) 
should voluntarily undertake “best practices” to protect minors.169  In the language of 
the Commission “best practices” that the ISPs are encouraged to pursue mean 
“voluntarily providing, offering, or enabling user empowerment technologies to 
assist end-users to protect children from materials that is harmful to minors.”170  In 
promoting “best practices,” ISPs are also encouraged to apprise consumers of the 
right of ISPs to take bona fide action to restrict availability of material that violates 
such practices.171  Timely removal of child pornography by ISPs when made aware 
of its presence on their servers is also recommended by the Commission as part of 
“best practices.”172  
There are numerous ways in which self-regulation of the internet content is 
already being implemented today.173  Net Nanny, 174 Cyber Patrol,175 SurfWatch,176 
and others provide consumers with software for blocking offensive content on the 
ISPs’ systems.  This type of filtering/blocking, referred to as client-side filtering, is 
achieved by using Universal Resource Locator (hereinafter “URL”) lists.177  Each 
blocking software maker compiles its own encrypted list of blocked websites which 
may or may not be disclosed.178  A list of sites, the content of which is blocked by a 
particular piece of software, can be made on the basis of automated processes, user 
                                                                
168COPA Commission’s recommendations were grouped in five categories: 
(1) educating the public by the government as well as by the private sector about 
technologies and methods available to protect children online; 
(2) empowering consumers with protecting technologies to make choices of online 
content for their children; 
(3) enforcing existing federal and state laws against obscenity and child 
pornography as well as addressing international aspects of Internet crime; 
(4) encouraging Internet Service Provider industry to self-regulate by voluntarily 
undertaking “best practices” to protect minors; 
(5) encouraging adult industry to self-regulate in order to restrict minors’ ready 
access to commercial online adult content.  See COMMISSION, supra note 122, at 39-
46. 
169Id. at 44-45.  
170Id.  
171Id. at 45. 
172Id. 
173For a detailed overview of filtering/blocking tools and their effectiveness see 
COMMISSION, supra note 125, at 19-22. 
174For information on this filtering software see http://www.netnanny.com (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2000). 
175For information on this filtering software see http://www.cyberpatrol.com (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2000). 
176For information on this filtering software see http://www.surfwatch.com (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2000). 
177
“URL” refers to the address of an Internet site.  
178See COMMISSION, supra note 125, at 19. 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss1/7
2001] CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS 131 
options and human review.179  The COPA Commission’s rating of the effectiveness 
of server-side filtering was 7.4 on a scale of zero to ten.180  This was the highest 
rating regarding the relative effectiveness of different technologies and methods 
available today and examined by the Commission.181  The Commission also 
determined that while the server-side filtering raised First Amendment concerns 
because of its potential to be over-inclusive in blocking content, such impact is 
insignificant as long as the consumers are apprised of the criteria for filtering and 
filters are made customizable and flexible.182  
Because filtering and blocking software achieves somewhat effective results in 
censoring the internet content, the same technological tools that are being developed 
and used to prevent children from exposure to sexually explicit material on the web 
can be made available to adults who find such materials offensive and do not want to 
exercise their right to freedom of speech online to the full extent.183  Undertaking of 
the “best practices” advocated by the COPA Commission can be extended to apply 
not only to protection of children from material harmful to them, but also to 
protection of adults who find sexually explicit material offensive.  This could be 
achieved by having the ISPs develop tools for access to the internet with different 
levels of censorship.  As a result, consumers will have an ability to browse the web 
content to the extent it was filtered by the web browser of their choice.184  Consumers 
who do not find sexually explicit material offensive or obscene and those not 
concerned with the possibility that their children might be exposed to harmful 
materials, while exploring the online world, would be able to subscribe to services 
provided by ISPs with the content of the internet not subjected to any kind of 
blocking or filtering whatsoever.   
                                                                
179Id. 
180Id. 
181Besides server-side filtering, the following methods and technologies used for reducing 
access by children to harmful to minors materials were evaluated: online information 
resources that collect information regarding the technologies and methods that can protect 
children; family education programs; client-side filtering; filtering using text-based content 
analysis; labeling and rating systems; age verification systems; new top-level domain/zoning; 
increased prosecution and others.  Ratings were made regarding the relative effectiveness, 
accessibility, user cost, cost imposed on sources of lawful harmful to minors materials, and 
adverse impacts on privacy, First Amendment values, and law enforcement.  Id. 
182Id. at 19-20. 
183Attempts to block unwanted content are being compromised by counter efforts to 
develop computer programs that disable blocking software.  A group of free speech advocates 
called Peacefire: Open Access for the Net Generation released a new program that according 
to their claim can easily disable all popular Windows censorware (SurfWatch, Cyber Patrol, 
Net Nanny, CYBERsitter, X-Stop, PureSight and Cyber Snoop).  The release of the software 
is done in response to the passage of a Congressional bill requiring the use of blocking 
software in libraries and schools funded by the federal government. 
184Corporations such as Microsoft, America OnLine, Netscape or Internet search engines 
like Yahoo, Infoseek, Alta Vista, Hot Bot and others could develop and market several 
variations of the Internet browsing products each being tailored to the needs and concerns of a 
particular group of consumers. 
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On the other hand, consumers with heightened concerns for the online safety of 
their children and those consumers who do not seek sexually explicit content, by 
choosing a web browser equipped with filtering and blocking software, would be 
able to extract from the internet only the content rid of unwanted speech.  Thus, by 
allowing consumers to make an informed decision in tailoring their preferences with 
respect to the speech published online, the problem of affecting unwilling recipients 
would be eliminated.  Also, the First Amendment right to free speech would not be 
seriously affected by potential over-inclusivity in blocking content if consumers 
voluntarily choose the software with particular filtering criteria and are aware of the 
fact that certain speech, though not the type they are trying to avoid, will be made 
unavailable to them due to present technological shortcomings of the software. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The obscenity law has not changed since the decision in Miller v. California.  
The invention of the internet and its non-geographic nature practically rendered the 
Miller test unconstitutional when applied to this new medium.  The concept of 
contemporary community standards of the current obscenity test is out of pace with 
the advancement of new technologies.  To avoid the chilling effect on freedom of 
expression by subjecting materials published on the internet to vague and subjective 
community standards the content of the internet communications should be left to 
self-regulation.  Freedom of individual consumers as to the type of internet content 
they choose to view should not be curtailed.  Necessity to come up with new 
approaches of solving problems related to freedom of speech in the era of the 
internet is dictated by this unconventional medium.  The time is ripe to reconsider 
the fundamentals of the First Amendment’s guarantee in order to keep freedom of 
speech in the default setting.  
ROMAN A. KOSTENKO185 
                                                                
185The author wishes to express gratitude to Professor Karin Mika and the law firm of 
Berkman, Gordon, Murray & DeVan, in particular Lorraine Baumgardner, Esq. and Steven 
Shafron, Esq., for their valuable input. 
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